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THE COLLECTIBILITY OF SPECIAL
ASSESSMENTS MORE THAN TEN-YEARS
DELINQUENT
PEYTON B. ABBOTT*

The collection or foreclosure of the lien of any installment of special
assessments upon real estate for local improvements is barred after ten
years from the date such installment became due and payable. This is
the import of the decision in the recent case of Raleigh v. Mechanics
and Farmers Bank, where the court, in a four to three decision, held
that C. S. 2717(a) 2* is an independent ten-year statute of limitation
which operates to bar foreclosure of installments more than ten years
past due even when suit is instituted under the provisions of C. S.
7990.3*
The-year before, a unanimous court had handed down a similar ruling in the case of Charlotte v. Kavanaugh.4 But five years before that,
the court had stated, in Asheboro v. Morris,5 which was also a suit to
foreclose the lien of a street assessment: "Where the sovereign elects
or chooses to proceed under C. S. 7990, no statute of limitations is
applicable." The Charlotte Case apparently did not attract very wide
attention outside of the City of Charlotte, possibly because a large part
* LL.B., 1931, University of North Carolina Law School.

Assistant Director,

Institute of Government, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.
'223 N. C. 286, 26 S.E. (2d) 573 (1943).
2*N. C. CoDe ANx. (Michie, 1939) §2717(a). It reads as follows: "Sale or
foreclosure for unpaid assessments barred in 10 years; no penalties. No statute
of limitation, whether fixed by law especially referred to in this chapter or otherwise, shall bar the right of the municipality to enforce any remedy provided by
law for the collection of unpaid assessments, whether for paving or other benefits,
and whether such assessment is made under this chapter or under other general
or specific acts, save from and after ten years from default in the payment
thereof, or if payable in installments, ten years from the default in the payment
of any installments. No penalties prescribed for failure to pay taxes shall apply
to special assessments, but they shall bear interest at the rkte of six -per cent
per annum only. In any action to foreclose a special assessment the cost shall
be taxed as in any civil action, and shall include an allowance for the commissioner appointed to make the sale, which shall not be more than five per cent
of the amount for which the land is sold, and one reasonable attorney's fee for
the plaintiff. This section shall apply to all special assessments heretofore or
hereafter levied, but shall not apply to any special assessement for the collection
of which an action or proceeding has heretofore been instituted (1929, c. 331,

S.1)."

1*N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7990. Numerous cases have held that
no statute of limitations is applicable to a suit to foreclose the lien of ad valorem
taxes instituted under this statute. See cases cited in Asheboro v. Morris, 212
N. C. 331, 193 S. E. 424 (1937).
' 221 N. C.259, 20 S.E. (2d) 97 (1942).
'212 N. C.331, 193 S.E.424 (1937).
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of the decision was concerned with the validity of local acts.O* And it
was true, as pointed out by the majority opinion in the Raleigh Case,
that C. S. 2717(a) was not involved and appears not to have been
called to the attention of the court in Asheboro v. Morris. So, when
the appeal in the Raleigh Case came on for determination, the court
apparently treated the question presented almost as one of first impression. Both the majority and minority expressed the desirability of
examining "with cold neutrality" the legal effect of the statute. Deepseated conviction as to both policy and precedent is apparent from
reading the majority and minority opinions.
The majority of the court could and did argue with considerable
force that before the enactment of C. S. 2717(a) there were a number of
local acts prescribing periods of limitations of varying lengths; that
some cases had suggested the applicability of the regular three-year
statute to special assessment foreclosure actions; and that C. S. 2717(a)
was intended to provide a definite state-wide ten-year statute and end
the confusion in this field. It added strength to its argument by pointing out that the caption of the section, "Sale or Foreclosure for Unpaid
Assessments Barred in Ten Years," was enacted as a part of the statute.
And it buttressed its position by the decision in Charlottev. Kavanaugh,
supra.
The minority could and did argue with considerable force that C. S.
2717(a) was intended to do no more than extend to ten years such
shorter periods of limitati6n as might be provided by pre-existing
statutes; that the General Assembly did. not intend to provide an independent ten-year statute where none existed before; that the statute is
somewhat ambiguous and such ambiguity should be resolved in favor
of the sovereign, in this case the municipality acting in its governmental
capacity; that numerous cases had previously held that *no statute of
limitations is applicable where suit to foreclose taxes is instituted under
C. S. 7990. And it buttressed its position by the language in Asheboro
v. Morris, quoted above.
No useful purpose would be served by entering into a discussion of
the many cases cited by both the majority and minority; for none of
these cases (except Charlotte v. Kavanaugh) dealt directly with the
7
question before the court-the effect of C. S. 2717(a). *
G*Following the Charlotte Case, C. S. 2717(a) was amended by Ch. 181, Sess.
Laws 1943, to raise the statute of limitations from ten to fifteen years, applicable
to the city of Charlotte only. The Act expressly provided that it should not be
construed to revive any right of action which had been theretofore barred. Local
acts were also passed with reference to the time allowed for the collection of
assessments in the towns of Aulander and Morehead City. N. C. Sess. Laws
1943, c. 235, c. 420.
7* For example, in Farmville v. Paylor, 208 N. C.
106, 179 S. E. 690 (1935),
which was an action to foreclose a special assessment lien, the defendant pleaded
a ten-year statute, though it is not clear just which one, whether C. S. 2717(a) or
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The apparent effect of the decision in the Raleigh Case is to place
in jeopardy, if not to bar, the collection of hundreds of thousands of
dollars in delinquent assessments in cities and towns throughout North
Carolina. If this money is lost, it must be made up through general
taxation. Some cities which have been able to set up tidy capital reserves
for a rainy day or for postwar reconstruction may find that it has already rained and that those reserves have, in effect, been more than
washed out. The following study was undertaken in an effort to discover whether those delinquent assessments must indeed be counted as

lost and gone forever. Is a way still open through which those assessments may yet be collected?
In the light of the Raleigh Case, must all installments more than
ten years delinquent be counted a total loss? This question may be
broken down into two sub-questions: (1) Assuming that actions to
foreclose installments have become barred by C. S. 2717(a), can the
7
legislature by subsequent action revive such rights of action? '* (2)
Has the legislature already enacted legislation which may enable municipal corporations to save their assessements from the bar of the statute?
C. S. 437 (actions on judgments). However, this was not material since the
court held that ten years had not elapsed since the accrual of the right of action.
The Farinville Case cited High Point v. Clinard, 204 N. C. 149, 167 S. E. 690
(1933), another assessment foreclosure case also cited in the Raleigh Case.- In
the High Point Case, the court held that the three-year statute did not apply,
because a ten-year statute did apply, as held in Drainage District v. Huffstetler,
173 N. C. 523, 92 S.E. 360 (1917). The Drainage District Case was also cited
in the Raleigh Case, but that case was decided twelve years before C. S. 2717(a)
was enacted and the ten-year statute therein mentioned was C..S. 437. Again, in
both the High Point and Drainage District Cases, ten years had not elapsed
since the accrual of the action and the point before the court was the applicability
of the three-year statute. In Statesville v. Jenkins, 199 N. C. 159, 154 S. E. 15
(1930) C. S.2717(a) was pleaded as a defense, but no question of construction
was involved as the court held that it did not apply to the particular situation.
7A* This assumption must be restricted to actions brought under C. S. 7990,
which was the type of action with which both Charlotte v. Kavanaugh and Raleigh
v. Mechanics and Farmers Bank were concerned. It would seem that where
actions to foreclose certificates of sale of the lien of special assessments under
Section 1719 of Chapter 310, P. L. 1939 (The Machinery Act of 1939) may be
brought, no statute of limitations is provided. In this connection it may be noted:
(1) that Sec. 2(32) of the Act defines "tax" or "taxes" to mean and include
any taxes, special assessments, costs, penalties, and/or interest imposed upon
property or other subjects of taxation"; (2) that Sec. 1719(a) of the Act provides that "Actions for the foreclosure of tax liens (which by definition, include
special assessment liens) brought under this section shall be brought not less
than six months after the sale hereinbefore provided for," without further limitation; (3) that C. S.8037, which formerly provided a two-year statute of limitations upon actions to foreclose tax and assessment sales certificates, was expressly

repealed by the Machinery Act; and (4) the Machinery Act was enacted ten
years later than C. S. 2717(a), and since it now provides a procedure for the
foreclosure of special assessments without any period of limitations, C. S. 2717(a)
would appear to limit only those actions brought under C. S. 7990.
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1. CAN THE LEGISLATURE REVIVE INSTALLMENTS BARRED
BY C. S. 2717(a)?

The usual reaction of lawyers, both before the bar and on the bench,
is to take a running jump at such a question as this and answer quickly,
"no," especially when it is not necessary to answer the question definitely in order to decide the case at hand. Also, the text-writers have
generally placed North Carolina among the jurisdictions holding that
once a right of action has been barred by a statute of limitations, the
legislature is powerless to revive the right of action by subsequent legislation, usually citing Whitehurst v.Dey,8 and other cases supported by
that case, as their authority. In spite of those cases, in spite of the
text-writers, and in spite of the impulse of lawyers to give quick and
unqualified answers, a study of the cases where the question had to be
answered, directly and definitely, in order to decide the case before the
court reveals that the "no" is subject to considerable qualification.
One of the earliest cases in which the question was directly presented to the court arose upon a petition for dower. 9 A will had been
probated in November, 1864, and the diissent of the widow and petition for dower was not filed until May, 1866. The defendants, devisees
under the will, pleaded the six months statute of limitations contained
in the Act of 1784, which the court held to be a six months limitation
upon the right of a widow to dissent. But the court held that the Act
of February, 1866, giving 'widows further time to dissent, was constitutional and applied it to the case at bar although at the time of its passage the plaintiff's right of action was already barred under the Act of
1784. Said the court (p. 415) : "Suppose a simple contract debt created
in 1859. In 1862 the right of action was barred by the general statute

of limitations, which did not extinguish the debt, but simply barred the
right of action. Then comes the Act of 1863, providing that the time
from 20 May, 1861 (to the close of the war) shall not be counted. Can
the debtor object that this deprives him of a vested right? Surely not.
It only takes from him the privilege of claiming-the benefit of a former

statute, the operation of which is for a season suspended.
"So the Act of 1784 does not extinguish the widow's common law
right of dower, but simply bars her right of action, unless she enters
her dissent within six months and makes claim to her right of dower
within that time. Then comes the Act of February, 1866, providing
that she shall have further time. Can the devisee object that this deprives him of his land? Surely not. It only takes from him the privilege of claiming the benefit of a former statute, whereby to bar the
widow's common law right."
890 N. C. 542 (1884).
' Hinton v. Hinton, 61 N. C. 410 (1868).
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Vested rights? If the estate was solvent, the devisees found the
title which had become absolute by reason of the widow's failure to
act in time again subjected to her claim for -dower. If the estate was
insolvent, the creditors found the means for the satisfaction of their
claims reduced to the extent of the dower right thus revived.
An act authorizing the retroactive assessment of real estate for taxes,
enacted after the statutory time for levying assessments had elapsed,
was approved in Railroad v. Commissioners,'° a case directly in point
with the question we are considering. Chapter 158, Laws of 1879, reciting that the railroads had failed to pay their proper state and county
taxes upon a large amount of real and personal property in the county
of Alamance for the years 1869 to 1876 inclusive, due to failure to list,
recovery of illegal assessments, litigation and other causes, authorized
the county authorities to revise and correct the tax lists of said railroads for the specified years."* The railroad sought to enjoin the
commissioners from carrying out the provisions of the act upon the
ground (among others) that the time for collecting the taxes under the
pre-existing law had expired, and that the act of 1879 was retroactive
12
and unconstitutional *
While the court admitted that it was being virtually called upon to
decide a case in advance of its trial upon the merits, it held that the
legislature could extend the right to assess property and collect taixes
thereon, although the time fixed by the statute in effect had expired.
At p. 266 the court said: "The retrospective features of the act are not
fatal to its validity. -It does not undertake to impose new burdens or
additional liabilities upon the companies, but to pursue and charge the
taxable property which they possessed and which has escaped its share
of the common burden. It seeks nothing more. No vested rights are
invaded; no wrong done by the means employed to correct a common
error and prevent an unjust and unintended exemption. Remedial in its
scope and operation, it undertakes to provide against the consequences
of the omission and neglect of public agencies and to have now done
what ought to have been done before....
"The State has a lien upon land for taxes actually levied and also
for such as were properly put upon the land, but by reason of the neg82 N. C. 259 (1880). Hinton v. Hinton was cited and approved in this
case.
". For the background of litigation see: Railroad v. Commissioners of Orange,
77 N. C. 4 (1877) ; Railroad v. Commissioners of Alamance, 76 N. C. 212 (1877);
Railroad v. Commissioners of Brunswick, 72 N. C. 10 (1875).
2* The court had held, in Railroad v. Commissioners of Alamance, 77 N. C.
4 (1877) that the pertinent sections of the then current revenue law meant that
"lands cannot be listed or taxed (either by the owner or by the county.commissioners) under the revenue law for a year preceding the current year. So that if
any real estate liable to taxation thus escapes being listed, no tax is due or
collectible. ..."

128
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lect of the officers entrusted with the duty of assessing it the land was
omitted for a particular year ....
The legislative authority given to
tax the property for the omitted years is not exhausted by the failure
of the party or the assessor to place it on the roll, and such assessments
are valid. . . . There are numerous instances in our own legislation
where the time for the collection of unpaid taxes has been extended to
those due for many years previous, for the indemnity and reimbursement of the collecting officer and the sureties on his official bond and
their legal representatives, without question, so far as we know, as to
the competency of the Legislature to make the enactment."
In Wilmington v. Cronly,lS* which cited with approval Railroad v.
Commissioners of Alamance, supra, the court held valid an act which
authorized a town to collect taxes which had become uncollectible many
years before the passage of the act. With respect to the statute of
limitations, the court said (p. 387): "It needs no citation of authority
to show that statutes of limitation never apply to the sovereign unless
expressly named therein-nullum tempus occurrit regi-and the act in
question authorizing the State, county and city to recover these delinquent taxes contains no limitation, and neither the ten years nor the
three years statute applies."
From this language it is apparent that the court construed the Act
of 1895 not merely as one to suspend the statute of limitations, or to
lift the bar of the statute, but as an Act conferring an independent
right to collect back taxes that were not collected within the time previously given. That is, the Act is something of a "recapture" statute,
authorizing collection of former legal obligations and based upon the
14
fact of non-payment. *
-3* 122 N. C. 383, 30 S. E. 9 (1898).
This was an action instituted in 1896

under authority of Ch. 182, Pub. Laws 1895 to subject real estate to sale to
satisfy taxes for as far back as 20 years, taxes for the years 1875, 1876, 1877,
1881, 1885, 1886, 1891 and 1892 being involved in the suit. Ch. 182, Pub. Laws
1895 was entitled "An Act to provide for the collection of arrearages of taxes
in the City of Wilmington, in the County of New 'Hanover, and State of North
Carolina." The Act set no time limit upon the retrospective operation of its
provisions, nor did it contain any' repealing clause as to any public or local act.
The defendant pleaded the ten-year statute of limitations and also Ch. 198, Laws
of 1858-59 entitled "An Act concerning the Town of Wilmington" which provided, relative to sales for taxes (sec. 3), that "no sale of any land for taxes
shall be made sooner than three months after such taxes have been laid or imposed, or later than three years thereafter." The lower court held that the tenyear statute of limitations applied, but that the three-year statute did not. Both
parties appealed, the appeals being separately reported. Neither statute was held
applicable. On defendant's appeal, the court (Clark, J.) said (p. 385): "The
right of taxation is the highest and most essential power of government (R. R. v.
Alsbrook, 110 N. C. 137, 14 S. E. 652), and is necessary to its existence. All
who are liable to the payment of taxes should pay their legal share. Those who
fail to do so simply devolve its payment upon others, for taxes being essential to
the existence of government, if any do not pay, others have to pay for them. It
justly follows that if taxes are not paid within the statutory time, the legislature
can authorize the collection of such arrearages notwithstanding."
14* This construction is borne out in the court's discussion of plaintiff's appeal.
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Whatever the theory of the statute-whether it lifted the bar of the
statute of limitations or conferred an independent right to levy and collect taxes based upon the non-payment of taxes which had become
legally uncollectible, the reasoning of the court and the effective result
would appear to apply with equal force to a statute which would enable
local units to assess and collect "taxes" or "assessments" upon real
estate which, by reason of neglect, misapprehension as to the law, unwarranted indulgence on the part of local officials or other causes, has
escaped its fair share of the cost of local improvements, such assessments and collection to be based upon the fact of non-payment of
previous assessments, valid when made.
In Jones v. Arrington 5 an act which revived, for the benefit of an
individual, the power to collect back taxes after the power had lapsed
was held valid. This presents a situation much less worthy of legislative assistance and judicial sympathy than does the plight of cities
and towns which must consider making up by general taxation those
special assessments which have become uncollectible through the passage
of time. And it would seem that the person who is finally made to
pay his fair share of improvements which have especially benefitted his
property, rather than being allowed to pass this burden along to others,
has even less cause for complaint than the defendant in Jones v. Arrington, where a general tax was involved.
Jones, former sheriff of Warren County, had duly settled for taxes
for the years 1873 to 1881 inclusive, but had not collected all of said
taxes and the time for collecting had expired. The Legislature authorized him to collect such taxes, "under the same rules and regulations as
are prescribed by law for the regular collection of taxes, and the power
The court said (p. 391): "In fact, however, it is the latter, for as we said in
Jones v. Arrington, 91 N. C. 125 (at p. 130), an act to collect arrearages of

taxes is not an enactment that attempts to revive a demand that has been barred
by the statute of limitations, which would be repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States, as was recently declared in Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C. 542.
The act of 1895 is the act of the sovereign directing the collection of taxes for the
years in which the delinquent's -property has not paid its quota, as required by law,
to the support of the public burdens and providing procedures by which that
quota may be ascertained, giving the alleged delinquents a hearing and providing
further that the total amount of the delinquency so ascertained may be declared
a lien on the property which the defendant had at its passage, and that it may be
sold as under foreclosure. Thus no question under this statute can arise as to
liens for taxes upon property which the delinquent has sold off before the passage
of the act.
"The same right to collect arrearages of taxes is generally recognized. 'Unless

there be some constitutional restriction the Legislature may authorize a munic-

ipality to levy and collect retrospective taxes, and for this purpose use the assessment roll of a previous year. . . .' There is no hardship in this proceeding. It
is essentially just. It merely compels taxpayers who have evaded their share of
the public burdens to fulfill their duty, and to that extent relieves those who have
faithfully borne the heat and burdens of the day and will discourage like evasions
in the future."
25 91 N. C. 125 (1884).
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and authority hereby granted shall cease on 1 January, 1884."'0 This
action was to enforce collection of taxes under that act. The lower
court held that the act was unconstitutional and inoperative. Upon
appeal, the lower court was reversed. Said Smith, C. J., at page 128:
"It would thus seem that the possession of the power to remove the
obstruction arising from the lapse of time, and again exposing the delinquent taxpayer to the remedies provided for the enforced payment
when it is due, has been so long exercised, and promptly vindicated by
judicial -decision when denied, that it must now be settled beyond the
reach of controversy. . . . Such an enactment does not operate upon
the debt, or liability of the taxpayer, which remains as before, but is
simply a removal of a restriction imposed upon the collector upon
grounds of public policy in cases in which it is deemed proper to grant
the indulgence."
An Act 17 reviving the right to collect delinquent taxes, for the benefit
of sureties on the collector's bond, was assumed to be valid in Moore v.
Sugg.' s Thus, real estate which had escaped taxation by the passage
of time, was again made liable for sale to satisfy the lien of those outof-date taxes. And this right was revived, not for the benefit of the
taxing unit or public at large, but for the benefit of the sureties on the
collectors' bonds, the taxes having been already settled with the taxing
units. The case arose upon an application for injunctive relief, the
plaintiff contending that he was an innocent purchaser without notice
that back taxes were unpaid. But neither the plaintiff nor the court
appeared to question the validity of the act.
Coming to more modern times, we find a series of acts empowering
sheriffs and tax collectors to collect back taxes after collection had
already become barred being upheld in Hunt v. Cooper,10 which seems
to be in point with the question under consideration. This was an action
to restrain the sale of land for back taxes, and to recover taxes for
other years paid under protest. Section 7998 of the Consolidated Statutes of 1919 limited the time for the collection of taxes to one year from
the day prescribed for the settlement of taxes, and under that statute
the collection of taxes for which the land was being sold would have
been barred, except for the series of acts extending the right to collect
back taxes. The court held the acts effective to permit the collection of
taxes which had not been collected within the time limited.
The series of acts discussed in Hunt v. Cooper began in 1921. The
Legislature of that year passed "An act for the relief of sheriffs and
tax collectors," 20 which authorized the collection of taxes for the years
" N. C. Pub.-Priv. L. 1883. c. 79.
" 112 N. C. 233, 17 S.E. 72 (1893).
'9 194 N. C. 265, 139 S. E. 446 (1927).
"oN. C. Pub. L. 1921, c. 33.

N. C. Pub.-Priv. L. 1891, c. 391.
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1915 to 1920 inclusive, "under such rules and regulations as are now
or may hereafter be provided for the payment of taxes." It was provided that the authority thus given should "cease and determine" on
January 1, 1923. The 1923 Legislature, after the power to collect such
back taxes had "ceased and determined," passed two acts with respect
to the same subject. One of them, 21 while making no reference to the
1921 Act, employed identical language except that it covered taxes for
the years 1917 to 1922 inclusive and provided that the power should
cease January 1, 1924. The other merely extended the authority granted
in the 1921 Act to January 1, 1925.22 After the powers given under
both the 1923 acts had lapsed, the 1925 Legislature included taxes for
the year 1923 and 1924 and extended the power to make collection of
such back taxes to January 1, 1927.23 Again, after the power granted
under the 1925 Act had lapsed, the 1927 Legislature amended the 1925
Act to include taxes for the years 1925 and 1926 and to extend the
power to collect back taxes for all the years specified to January 1,
1929.24

This series of acts given effect in Hunt v. Cooper, supra, has been
traced in -detail because it furnishes a striking analogy to another series
of acts relating to assessments for local improvement, now appearing in
our statutes as C. S. 2717(b) ,25 which will be discussed later. The
important facts to bear in mind with respect to the series of acts outlined above is that the power to collect taxes and therefore to enforce
the lien for taxes had been lost by the passage of time before the legislature acted to restore the right of collection and thus to revive the
enforcibility of the lien; that the power first given had in turn lapsed
through the passage of time before being again restored by subsequent
legislation, and so on successively; and that the court, in Hunt v. Cooper,
supra, held that this was within the power of the legislature.
Another series of acts that furnishes an analogy to the successive
enactments now codified as C. S. 2717(b) concerns extension of time
for the foreclosure of liens of taxes under C. S. 803726 which contained
a limitation of five years upon actions by counties and municipalities
to foreclose tax sale certificates. In 1927 this section was rewritten to
27
provide a limitation of eighteen months.
In 1929 the Legislature provided: "Any certificate of sale in the
hands of any person, corporation, firm, county or municipality on which
"1N. C. Pub.-Priv. L. 1923, c. 108. This Act was incorporated into the Consolidated
Statutes, Vol. III (1924) as §8005(a)-(d).
2
N. C. Pub.-Priv. L. 1923, c. 201.
2

N. C. Pub. L. 1925, c. 80.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 89.
'IN. C. CoIE AN. (Michie, 1939) §2717(b).
"' N. C. CODE AwN. (Michie, 1939) §8037. Repealed, N. C. Pub. L. 1939, C.
310, 7§1725.
N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 221.
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an action to foreclose has not been brought, which according to the
terms of chapter two hundred and twenty-one of the Public Laws of
one thousand nine hundred and twenty-seven should have been brought,
shall have until December first, one thousand nine hundred and twentynine to institute such action. This action and extension shall and does
include all such certificates whether the same were issued for the sale
of one thousand nine hundred and twenty-seven taxes and any and all
certificates sold or issued prior thereto. '28 (Italics ours.)
After the time extended by the 1929 Legislature had lapsed, the
1931 Legislature amended the 1929 Act to extend the time for bringing tax sale certificate foreclosures to December 1, 1931,20 The 1929
Act was considered in Wilkes County v. Forester0 and Forsyth County
v. Joyce,3' both decidbd at the same term, both being actions to foreclose tax sale certificates under C. S. 8037, both involving taxes for
the years 1924 and 1925, and in both cases the plea of the 18 months
statute of limitations under the 1927 Act was interposed. The Wilkes
County Case held that the action was barred and was not revived by
the 1929 or the 1931 Act. The Forsyth County Case held that the
action was maintainable, upholding and giving effect to the Act of
1929. The latter case could not have reached the result it did, certainly with respect to the certificate purchased in 1925 for 1924 taxes
and the certificate purchased in 1926 for 1925 taxes without' holding
the 1929 Act valid and within the power of the legislature.
At first glance the two cases seem to be hopelessly irreconcilable.
A careful study of the cases, however, reveals that they are not necessarily at odds, and that a logical and tenable distinction may be drawn.
It is true that Justice Clarkson, writing the opinion in the Wilkes
County Case, said (p. 170): "Whatever may be the holdings in other
jurisdictions, we think this jurisdiction is committed to the rule that
an enabling statute to revive a cause of action barred by the statute
of limitations is inoperative and of no avail." Not only do the North
Carolina cases cited in the opinion fail to bear out this statement, unless
dicta be given more weight than the actual decisions where the matter
had to be passed upon, but the statement was not necessary to the
decision in the Wilkes County Case. Under the factual situation presented and the peculiar language employed in the 1929 and 1931 Acts
pointed out by Justice Clarkson,3 2 the same results could have been
reached without reference to the constitutionality of the 1929 and 1931
Acts. Since the action in the Wilkes County Case was barred under
either the 1927 or the 1929 Act, and since the court held that the 1931
28
2
N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 204.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1931, c. 260.
30204 N. C. 163, 167 S. E. 691 (1933).
31204 N. C. 734, 169 S. E. 655 (1933).
'-204 N. C. 163, 165, 167 S. E. 691, 692 (1933).
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Act was not applicable to the case, the question of the constitutionality
of the 1929 and 1931 Acts was not before the court. Certainly, it was
not necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act as it was in
the Forsyth County Case.
Justice Clarkson cited with approval the case of Hunt v. Cooper,
discussed above, but stated that the instant case was different in that
the statute of limitations was involved. If there is a distinction in principle between the two cases it is a distinction without a difference; for
both cases were concerned with the attempt to subject real estate, which
had come under the protection of a time limitation, to a lien for taxes
by virtue of subsequent legislation. And so again, the true ground
upon which the decision in the Wilkes County Case must rest is the
inapplicability of the statutes subsequently enacted, not their unconstitutionality.
The case of Whitehurst v. Dey33 appears to be the earliest and most
often cited case upon the categorical proposition that attempts by the
legislature to revive barred actions are unconstitutional and void. It is
almost invariably cited by text-writers who put North Carolina in the
column of states denying to the legislature the right to revive barred
actions. In this case the Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff upon an indebtedness against 'defendant's testator on' the ground
that the running of the statute of limitations was not suspended by
promises to pay the debt. Although this was a sufficient basis for the
decision, the court discussed the plaintiff's contention that his claim was
preserved by an intervening statute as follows :34 "It is next contended

that the amendatory act of 1881 has a retrospective operation and requires in the count of time the elimination of so much as elapsed after
the filing of the claim in 1874. ..
"A reasonable and fair interpretation of this latter clause will confine it to such claims as had already been filed and had not then become
barred; and this, as it meets the requirements of the act, without disturbing rights that time has settled and fixed, must be assumed to have
been the intention of the general assembly in its passage. Where, of
two reasonable constructions of a statute, the one of which the legislature is clearly competent to enact, while the other infringes upon the
constitution, the former will be accepted as its meaning; because it will
not be supposed that an unauthorized power was intended to be exercised. This rule of construction prevails in the enforcement of laws
of doubtful import and is acted upon by the courts ....
"If, however, we are compelled by the general words used to extend
the enactment so as to embrace claims which had become remediless
by action at the time of its passage, and impart new life and activity
- 90

N. C. 542 (1884).

-IN. C. Pub. L. 1881, c. 80.
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to the obligation, we should be disposed to hold its operation in these
cases to be an impairment of vested rights and as falling within the
inhibition of the federal constitution, notwithstanding the loubts expressed by Mr. Justice Reade in Pearsall v. Kenan, 79 N. C. 472, based
upon the ruling in Hinton v. Hinton, 61 N. C. 410."
Three points should be noted with respect to the Whitehurst Case
in assessing its value as a precedent on the point under discussion:
1. The principal question involved, as stated by the court, was the
effect that the defendant's successive promises to pay had on the running of the statute of limitations.
2. The court chose to refuse to give effect to the amendatory act
of 1881 as a matter of judicial construction of legislative intent to give
the act prospective effect only, rather than to declare the act unconstitutional as applied to this case.
3. The court stated that if it were compelled to construe the act to
embrace claims which had already become remediless at the time of its
passage it would be "disposed" to hold its operation in those cases to
be an impairment of vested rights and as "falling 'within the inhibition
of the federal constitution." (Italics supplied.)
As to point 1, it is worthy of notice that the court stated that it was
"the only point presented in the record for our consideration." As to
point 2, the court could construe the legislative intent (that the Act
was not intended to have retroactive effect) without reference to the
constitutionality of the Act. As to point 3, it is noted that the court
admitted that its discussion with reference to the validity of an act
purporting to revive rights of action after the bar has operated was
dicta and not necessary to the decision of the case. And it is further
noted that the court stated that if such holding were necessary it would
be "disposed" to so hold upon the grourld that such act fell "within
the inhibition of the federal constitution."
In Campbell v.Holt"5 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the repeal of a statute of limitations upon actions upon debts does
not deprive the debtor of his property in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, although at the time of the repeal of
the statute the right of action had already become barred. In denying
that a person could acquire a vested right in the denial of a remedy to
his creditor the court said at p. 629:
"We can understand a right to enforce payment of a lawful debt.
The Constitution says that no State shall pass any law impairing this
obligation. But we do not understand the right to satisfy that obligation by a protracted failure to pay. We can see no right which the
11115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209, 29 L. ed. 483 (1885).
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promisor has in the law which permits him to plead lapse of time instead of payment, which shall prevent the legislature from repealing
that law, because its effect is to make him fulfill his honest obligations."
Thus the constitutional basis for the dictum in Whitehurst v. Dey,
supra, was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States the
following year, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held
many times since that retroactive features of a statute, especially tax
legislation, are not necessarily invalid.36* It is submitted that the
Whitehurst Case dictum has not been followed by any North Carolina
case in which the application of the dictum was necessary to the
decision.
A study of the history of Whitehurst v. Dey reveals that it has
been cited by our Supreme Court thirteen times. In four cases it was
cited upon the question of estoppel to plead the statute of limitations.37
In one case38 it was cited in support of the statement that the legislature has power to pass a statute barring claims against counties
unless presented within two years. One case 9 cited it in connection
with the formal requirements of "filing" a claim against a decedent's
estate. Only seven cases have repeated the Whitehurst dictum, and of
those seven, two refused to follow the dictum and gave effect to statutes reviving lost rights, 40 four referred to the dictum in a speculative
'6*Camipbell v. Holt was followed in United States v. Chicago and E. I. Ry.
Co., 298 Fed. 779 (D. C. Ill. 1924). The Revenue Act of 1916, Section 9(a)
had provided that in cases of "erroneous, false or fraudulent returns," the commissioner might make assessment of income and excess profits taxes at any time
within three years after the return is made. The Revenue Act of 1921, Section

250(d), provided that taxes due under prior acts may be assessed within five
years after the return is filed, and that in case of a "false or fraudulent return
with intent to avoid the tax," assessment may be made at any time. Held, such
provisions were effective to extend the time to five years for making assessment
on an erroneous return, although more than three years had elapsed after such
return before the passage of the act of 1921.
Except in gift tax cases based upon peculiar grounds [see Untermeyer v.
Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 72 L. ed. 645 (1928)] the Supreme
Court of the United States seems to be not greatly worried about the constitutionality of retroactive tax legislation, either state or federal, in so far as the federal
constitution is concerned. In Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 59 Sup. Ct. 121,
83 L. ed. 87 (1938) the court pointed out that for more than seventy-five years
it had been a familiar legislative practice of Congress in the enactment of revenue
laws to tax retroactively income or profits received during the year of the session
in which the taxing statute is enacted, and in some instances during the year of the
preceding session. Said the court: "The contention that the retroactive application of the Revenue Acts is a denial of the due process guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment . . . has been uniformly rejected." (Citing cases.)
'7 Jackson v. Parks, 216 N. C. 329, 4 S. E. (2d) 873 (1939); Wilson v.
Clement, 207 N. C. 541, 177 S. E. 797 (1934); Town of Franklin v. Franks, 205
N. C. 96, 170 S. E. 113 (1933); Tomlinson v. Bennett, 145 N. C. 279, 59 S. E.
37 (1907).
" Royster v. Commissioners, 98 N. C. 148, 3 S. E. 739 (1887).
"Home Corporation v. Creech, 205 N. C. 55, 169 S. E. 794 (1933).
"Wilmington v. Cronly, 122 N. C. 388, 30 S. E. 9 (1898) ; Jones v. Arrington,
91 N. C. 125 (1884).
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manner and then went forward to a decision upon other grounds, 41 and
only ofie appeared to give effect to it.42
On examination of the foregoing cases we see that the "leading"
case of Whitehurst v. Dey amounted to no more than dictum upon the
question of the right of the legislature to revive aclions already barred;
that such dictum was founded upon a supposed inhibition to be found
in the Constitution of the United States; that the Supreme Court of
the United States has since denied that such inhibition exists; and that
the dictum in the Whitehurst Case itself has never since been cited by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina as controlling authority in any
case in which the question had to be passed upon. The nearest the,
Court has come to applying the dictum was in Wilkes County v. Forester, supra, and with respect to that case it was seen that: (1) under
the fact situation and the construction of the court (and, indeed, the
express language of the Acts), the validity of the Acts declared invalid
was not involved, and (2) at the same term of Court (Forsyth County
v. Joyce, supra) when the question had to be dealt with, the same Act
was upheld and given effect.
And so we see how a dictum, picked up, repeated and quoted in
other dicta, without regard for the facts presented or the points at
issue, becomes a part of the "weight of authority"-"weight" being
thus determined by the mere quantity or volume, by repetition, by
linage taken up in the reports, rather than by quality and applicability
to the question at hand. The curious results of the undiscriminating
use of such dicta is well illustrated in the case of Womens Catholic
Order v. Valleytown Township,43 which was an action upon bond interest coupons issued by Valleytown Township. Some of the coupons
had matured more than two years before the institution of the suit,
and defendant pleaded the two-year statute of limitations, C. S. 442,
paragraph 1-claims against counties, cities and towns. After the coupons had been due for more than two years, and before the suit was
instituted, P. L. 1937, Ch. 359, was enacted providing that the section
should not apply to bonds, notes and interest coupons. The district
court held that the 1937 Act revived the action, upon authority of
Hinton v. Hinton, supra, and Campbell v.Holt, supra. Upon appeal
the district court was reversed, 44 the circuit court stating that in North
Carolina it was settled that an action upon an open account, barred by
the statute of limitations, could not be revived by subsequent legisla"High Point v. Clinard, 204 N. C. 149, 137 S. E. 690 (1933) ; Vanderbilt v.
R. R., 188 N. C. 568, 125 S. E. 387 (1924); In re Beauchamp, 146 N. C. 254,
59 S. E. 687 (1907) ; Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C. 766, 36 S. E. 172 (1900).
Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N. C. 163, 167 S. E. 691 (1933).
'332 F. Supp. 894 (D. C. N. C. 1940).
"115 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
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tion. Authority: Whitehurst v. Dey, supra. The circuit court went on
to hold, as a matter of construction, that the legislature did not intend
to give the amendment of 1937 retroactive effect. So again we have a
dictum based upon a dictum, and a rather curious result: an intermediate federal court, feeling bound by State Court decisions, citing a
dictum of the State Court based upon a supposed federal constitutional
objection after that supposed federal constitutional objection had been
dissipated by the highest federal authority. If Campbell v. Holt had
been decided the year before instead of the year after Whitehurst v.
Dey, it is reasonable to suppose that the dictum in the latter case would
never have been insinuated into our line of cases.
We conclude from a study of the North Carolina cases, and the federal cases to the extent the federal constitution is involved, that there
is no legal impediment to an act of the General Assembly in making
again collectible and enforcible liens for installments of assessments for
local improvements more than ten years past due. Whether such enactment would have the effect of reviving a right of action already
barred, as upheld in Hinton v. Hinton, supra, or of empowering the
assessment and collection of taxes after the time for taking such action
had already elapsed, as upheld in R. R. v. Commissioners of Alamance,
supra, or of extending the power to sell land for taxes after the power
had already ceased, as -upheld in Hunt v. Cooper, supra, or as an
"Act of the sovereign directing the collection of taxes for the years in
which the delinquent's property has not paid its quota," as upheld in
Wilmington v. Cronly, supra, or as the removal of an "obstruction arising from the lapse of time," as upheld in Jones v. Arrington, supra,
or would set a new period (after the expiration of the old) within
which the institution of suit would not be barred, as upheld in Forsyth
County v. Joyce, supra, should be of no great concern to the municipalities. Important is the fact that enabling acts, extensions of time,
renewals of power and removals of obstructions have been enacted from
time to time and uniformly upheld by our court when the chips were
down and the case could not be decided on some other point.
The above discussion 'and conclusion is particularly applicable to
cases involving taxes and assessments. The application and effect of
statutes of limitations are matters referred to public policy. The highest expression of public policy is to be found in the Constitution. Where
the Constitution is silent, the public policy declared by the legislature
is 'decisive, and if not contrary to that expressed by the Constitution
nor contrary to a positive injunction found therein, it should be given
effect by the court. If the legislature should declare as a matter of
public policy that all property benefitted by local improvements should
bear its fair share of the burden rather than being allowed to escape to
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the undeserved injury of the general taxpayer, and that where property
has escaped its fair share of the burden by reason of the passage of
time, indulgence or neglect of collectors or other causes, it may be
reassessed or obstructions to collections removed, there seems to be no
constitutional objection to giving effict to such declared policy if
couched in effective terms.
As a matter of fact, our Constitution encourages, rather than discourages an effective legislative declaration along the lines indicated.
It positively declares the public policy with respect to the matter. "The
power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner....
45
Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of property taxed."
Where is the justness or equity in making property which has paid in
full for benefits received from improvements pay again because other
property has received benefits but has shirked its burden? When
property thus specially benefitted is made to assume its burden, justness,
equity and uniformity will be restored rather than destroyed.
2. HAS THE LEGISLATURE ALREADY ENACTED LEGISLATION WHICH
MAY ENABLE: MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO SAVE THEIR

ASSESSMENTS FROM THE BAR OF THE STATUTE?
In discussing this question we are particularly referring to that
statute embodying a series of acts or amendments, now appearing as
C. S. 2717(b). That section is captioned "Extension of time for payment of special assessments." 46* It appears in the Code as an amendment to or as an addition to C. S. 2717--"Payment of assessment enforced," as also does C. S. 2717(a)--"Sale or foreclosure for unpaid
assessments barred in ten years; no penalties." In other words, all
three sections relate to the same subject-the collection of special assessments-and all should be read together in order to arrive at their intent
and purpose in the light of the situation existing at the time of their
enactment. Therefore, before tracing the history of C. S.2717(b) and
drawing our analogy and conclusion, let us take a brief look at the background-the situation existing at the time it first made its appearance' N. C. CONST., Art. V, §3.
"* "Extension of time for payment of special assessments.
At any time or
times prior to July the first, one thousand nine hundred and forty-two, the governing body of any city or town may adopt a resolution granting an extension
of the time for the payment of any installment or installments of any special assessment, including accrued interest thereon and costs accrued in any action to foreclose under the lien thereon, by arranging such installment or installments, interests and costs into a new series of ten equal installments so that one of said
installments shall fall due on the first Monday in October after the expiration of
one year after adoption of the aforesaid resolution and one of said installments
on the first Monday in October of each year thereafter." (As amended by c.
160, Pub. Laws 1941.) The statute was amended by c. 4, Sess. L. 1943 to extend
the power to February 1, 1945,
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in order to better understand what the Legislature intended to accomplish thereby.
C. S. 2717 was enacted as a part of the original act providing statewide machinery for making and assessing costs of local improvements.47 It was first amended in 1923 with respect to the time from
which interest should run.48 In 1929, it was again amended, by the
same act that enacted C. S. 2717(a), to provide for the reinstatement
49
of installments upon the payment of those past due.
In 1929, the effects of the great orgy of local improvements were
being felt. When the Legislature met that year the collapse of the
stock market was still ten months away, but the great land boom in
Florida and the lesser boom in North Carolina had billowed and burst,
leaving deflated real estate values burdened with assessment installments
past due and installments to come. The problem of assessments and
delinquencies was becoming acute-so 'acute that when Will Rogers
appeared in Raleigh while the legislature, was in session and told the
story of a committee of citizens offering to turn the country back to
the Indians as a gift, no one appeared to miss the point of the story
when he further told how- the Indians, after consideration, agreed to
accept the land back,-provided the street assessments were cancelled.
And so the first material change in the law of 1915 came in 1929,
after the land boom had subsided but while the country as a whole was
still happily counting its paper profits. The changes made (1) provided for the reinstatement of unpaid balances upon an installment
basis upon bringing installments up to date by paying those past due,
and (2) that no statute of limitations, whether contained in some local
act, some other statute, or otherwise provided would bar assessments
before the expiration of ten years. This displayed a policy of leniency
toward persons owing assessments and tended to encourage forbearance
in bringing suits by allaying fears that some shorter period might
operate to bar foreclosure. The statute further aided property owners
by providing that, instead of penalties prescribed for failure to pay
taxes (just reduced from 20% and 10% on tax sale certificates to
12% and 8% by Ch. 204) special assessments should only bear interest
at 6%.
THE HIsToRY OF C. S. 2717(b)
In 1931, with the bank holiday still two years off, the situation was
no less critical. There were more delinquencies rather than fewer.
The legislature again acted to permit municipalities to grant indulgences to those owing past due assessments by enacting Ch. 249, P. L.
1931 which, as amended, is now C. S. 2717(b).
"
" N.
N. C.
C. Pub.
Pub. L.
L. 1915,
1923, c.
c. 56.
87.
,9 N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 331.
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C. S. 2717(b) as originally enacted, authorized the governing body
of any city or town, prior to July 1, 1933 to grant extensions of time
for the payment of any past due installments, by tacking the delinquent
installments on to the end of the original installments. Certain provisos, unimportant to this discussion, were annexed.
In 1933, with the bank holiday in the foreground of one of the
blackest pictures ever faced by the nation in war or peace, with delinquencies the rule rather than the exception, when many pieces of
property could not be sold on the open market for the amount of the
unpaid installments of special assessments, the legislature amended the
1931 act by rewriting it. In order to further encourage forbearance, in
order to ease the pressure upon harassed property owners, and in order
to remove the necessity of proceeding to foreclosure at that time and
throw still more distressed property upon a paralyzed market, the act
provided that cities and towns might extend the payment of any installment and accrued interest thereon due prior to July 1, 1932, the
extended installments to be tacked on to the end of unmatured installments. This action was authorized to be taken at any time prior to
July 1, 1935. The proviso in the 1931 Act, that all accrued interest
must be paid up as a condition precedent to extension, was dropped.
Again in 1935, the legislature amended the section to authorize the
governing bodies, by resolution at any time prior to July 1, 1936, to
extend any installment or installments, including accrued interest and
costs accrued in any foreclosure actions, by arrang-ng the assessments
into a new series of ten annual installments.50 This power to extend,
rearrange and make current all installments was extended to July 1,
1938;51 to July 1, 1940;52 to July 1, 1942 ;53 and finally extended to
February 1, 1945. 54 So that ever since 1931 successive legislatures
have renewed and extended the power of municipalities to bring forward and make current (and even to make payable at some future
date) all delinquent installments, and this power is now in existence
and will continue until February 1, 1945.
DOES C.

S.2717(b)

PROVIDE A MEANS OF AVOIDING THE BAR

OF C. S.2717(a)?
What are the implications of C. S.2717(b) ? To what extent does it
qualify or place a condition upon the operation of C. S. 2 717(a)?
Suppose a city council should look in its books and, finding thereon
delinquent assessments that have been past due since 1922, adopt a
resolution extending the time for the payment of such installments and
" .C. Pub. L. 1935, c. 126.
52
" N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 172.
N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 198.
N. C. Pub. L. 1941, c. 160.
'N. C. Sess. L. 1943, c. 4.
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arrange them into a new series, as now authorized by statute? Ever
since 1931, C. S. 2717(b), as amended and extended by successive
legislatures, has been a part of the law relating to the collection of special assessments. It has given and still gives municipalities the power
to bring forward, renew, remove from the delinquent status, and rewrite
any delinquent installments. While the court held, in Raleigh v. Bank,
supra, that C. S. 2717(a) was an independent ten-year statute of limitations, the application and effect of C. S. 2717(b) was not discussed
either in the briefs of counsel or the opinion of the court. It was not
before the court for construction. It did not appear that Raleigh had
attempted to exercise the power given by the section. But is not the
operation of C. S. 2717(a) conditioned or dependent upon the nonexercise of the power granted by C. S. 2717(b) within the time limited?
In short, may not a municipality now bring all of'its delinquent installments up to date and even project them into the future, regardless of
age ?
The legislature may grant this power to municipalities unless in
'doing so it violates some provision of the United States or State Constitution. The federal cases cited above would seem to clear the way
so far as federal constitutional questions are concerned, even if C. S.
2717(b) is considered as an act to remove the bar after it has already
fallen, rather than as a condition annexed to the statute of limitations.
As to the State Constitution, we find no express or implied inhibition;
indeed, since the levy of special assessments is referred-to the taxing
power, we find express authority for the type of statute under consideration. Our Constitution provides: "The General Assembly shall not pass
any local, private, or special act or resolution relating to . . . extending
the time for the assessment or collection of taxes. . . . The General
Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating matters set
out in this section." 55 We are concerned with a general law relating
to the extension of time for the collection of special assessments, a
species of tax.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not construed C. S.
2717(b), but it has passed upon the effect of somewhat similar acts,
and has uniformly sustained them, even when such acts have opened
the way for collection of taxes twenty years old. Let us therefore
compare C. S. 2717(b) with the statutes that have been passed upon
and see what analogies may be drawn.
To begin with, it will be noted that C. S. 2717(b) authorizes the
extension of "any installment or installments of any special assessment,
including accrued interest thereon and cost accrued in any action to
foreclose under the lien thereon." The statute was first enacted two
" N. C. CoxsT. Art. II, §29.
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years after C. S. 2717(a), and it contains no limitation other than one
upon the time within which the power thus granted must be exercised.
In Wilmington v. Cronly, supra, where an act of 1895c °* authorized
collection of taxes which had long since become uncollectible, the court
held squarely that plaintiff's right to recover depended upon the Act
of 1895. Said the court at p. 387: "2. The other exception is that the
court did not hold that arrearages of taxes were protected by the three
years statute of limitations . . . a tax, though in one sense a debt, is
something more, and is not liable to the incident of debts between individuals. It needs no citation of authority to show that statutes of limitation never apply to the sovereign unless expressly named thereinnullum tempus occurrit regi-and the act in question . . . authorizing
the State, county, and city to recover these delinquent taxes contains no
limitation, and neither the ten years nor the three years statute applies."
Note that in the above quotation the maxim nullum temp us occurrit
regi was applied to the enabling Act of 1895, and not to the earlier
statute which limited the period of collection. C. S. 2717(b) likewise
contains no period of limitation and the maxim should likewise apply
to it.
With respect to the validity of the Act of 1895, the court further
said (p. 386): "1. Did the General Assembly have power to pass the
Act of 1895 empowering the State, county, and city to collect arrearages
of taxes? It is well settled that it has. In R. R. v. Commissioners of
Alamance, 82 N. C. 259, Smith, C. J., says: 'If a definite unpaid tax,
collectable within less than two years after it is levied may be enforced
by legislative permission years afterwards for the benefit of the collector and his sureties, it would seem that there could .be no legal impediment to the State's compelling the payment of its own just demands
against the delinquent taxpayer when they are ascertained in the mode
prescribed by law.' And, further, 'The retrospective features of the
act are not fatal to its validity. . . . No vested rights are involved.
No wrong is -done by the means employed to correct a common error
and prevent an unjust and unintended exemption.'"
A retroactive statute which permitted the assessment and collection
of taxes years after the right of assessment and collection had been
57
barred or lost was upheld in R. R. v. Commissioners.
Gd*
N. C. Pub. L. 1895, c. 182. Section 1 of the act provides as follows: "That
the state of North Carolina, the county of New Hanover, and the city of Wilmington may bring their joint or several action or actions in the superior court
of New Hanover county, for the enforcement and collection of all claims in favor
of said state, county, and city, for delinquent taxes against any person or property, whose names appear delinquent on the tax books or list of said city or county,
and the said superior court shall have jurisdiction to have, try and determine the
same."

5782

N. C. 259 (1880).
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Compare the series of enactments now embodied in C. S. 2717(b)
with that series of enactments "For the relief of sheriffs and tax collectors" upheld and given effect in Hunt v. Cooper, 194 N. C. 265, 139
S. E. 466 (1927). In that case, the first act of 1921 empowered collectors to proceed to collect taxes as far back as those for 1915, after
the taxes had already become uncollectible under the current law. At
any rate, the officers charged with the power and duty to collect taxes
could no longer take any action with respect to them for those years;
and a property owner could have successfully resisted any effort to collect or subject his property to sale except for the legislation enacted
subsequent to the erection by time of his defense. C. S. 2717(b) is
much milder: it has empowered cities and towns, by appropriate action,
to move their delinquencies ahead to the current or unmatured accounts,
and thus prevent the installments from becoming uncollectible. A property owner does not have as much reason to feel that his defense to an
action on delinquent assessment$ has become absolute as long as the time
within which the powers given under C. S. 2717(b) has not expired
as he had with respect to actions for delinquent taxes before the passage of the 1921 Act. For, viewing the whole law on the subject, he
would have good reason to feel that he had a defense because of the
passage of time and the indulgences granted him only if the city should
fail to extend the time for payment within the time authorized by C. S.
2717(b). And, as pointed out, that time does not expire until February 1, 1945.
Comparison might also be made with an act reviving the right to
foreclose tax sale certificates which was held effective in Forsyth
County v. Joyce, supra. There was the 18-months statute of limitations
under the Act of 1927. There was the Act of 1929, enacted after the
18 months had elapsed, authorizing actions to foreclose any certificates
which, under the 1927 Act, had not been instituted within the time
limited by the Act. The -1929 Act gave to holders of certificates who
had already lost their right of action until December 1, 1929 to institute their actions.
Suppose the legislature, instead of waiting two years to pass the
Act of 1929, had attached a proviso to the Act of 1927 as follows:
"Provided, that any county or municipality holding any tax sale certificate may, instead of instituting suit within 18 months of the date
thereof, extend the time for the payment thereof by resolution duly
adopted at any time prior to December 1, 1929 and may thereafter
institute suit upon such certificates within 18 months from such extended time for payment." Would not such a proviso have done much
less violence to the concept of vested rights than the Act of 1929 which
was given effect? Suppose a city, with such a proviso in effect, had
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failed to institute suit before the expiration of 18 months but had
adopted a resolution in November of 1929 extending the time for payment and had thereafter instituted suit within 18 months of such extended time. Would the Court have any constitutional difficulty in
holding that the action was maintainable? For the effect of such act
with the supposed proviso would be to give holders of tax sale certificates the choice between (1) bringing suit within 18 months, or (2)
extending time for payment by appropriate action taken prior to
December 1, 1929 and bringing suit within 18 months after such extended time for payment. It is submitted that such hypothetical case
would be much milder and more easily sustained than the actual case
that was sustained. It is further submitted that C. S. 2717(b) approximates the relationship to C. S. 2717(a) that the supposed proviso
would have borne to the Act of 1927, and that reading C. S. 2717 (a)
and 2717(b) together, the effect is to give municipalities the choice of:
(1) bringing suit upon each installment within ten years, or (2) forbearing to sue, but extending the time for payment by appropriate
resolution at any time prior to the expiration of such power and bringing suit within ten years after such extended time for payment.
We conclude, from a study of the foregoing cases and the acts
therein applied, that there is ample precedent for our Supreme Court
to give effect to resolutions extending the time for the payment of any
special assessment-certainly those which were not more than ten years
past due upon the ratification date of the Act of 1931, carried forward
as C. S. 2717(b), and perhaps even as to installments that were more
than ten years past due on that date. There appears to be no definitely
decided cases to the contrary.
It has been shown that every act of the legislature purporting to
extend the time for the collection of taxes, including the foreclosure
of liens upon real estate, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in
every instance in which the point has been directly at issue. The reasoning of those cases and the requirements of public policy expressed
therein apply with equal force to C. S. 2717(b). The acts reviving the
right to collect taxes included the revival of the right to foreclose liens
upon real estate, sometimes by express language and sometimes by implication. Surely the Court can as easily hold that C. S. 2717(b)
authorizes and empowers municipalities to take the action indicated
therein with the effect of keeping delinquent assessments from becoming uncollectible. Surely, this power is less strained than the power
of reviving the right to collect after it has been lost through the passage
of time.
One more similarity should be pointed out between the acts for the
relief of sheriffs and tax collectors and other acts reviving the right
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to collect taxes and C. S. 2717(b) : those acts did not in themselves
and by themselves effect collection. They merely empowered the proper
officials to institute such steps, within a definite time limit, which would
result in collecting previously uncollectible taxes. C. S. 2717(b) merely
authorizes municipalities by taking appropriate action within a definite
time limit, to prevent assessments from becoming uncollectible.
We therefore submit that the General Assembly by the passage and
extension of C. S. 2717(b), has already provided a means whereby
cities and towns may keep their delinquent assessments collectible, if
the court will construe such to have been the legislative intent. And it
is further submitted that in view of the background of delinquencies
existing at the time of the passage of the Act and the conditions existing at the times of its extension, together with the fact that the Act.
has very little meaning .in the absence of such legislative intent, a very
strong argument can be made in support of such construction. This
construction was suggested by Justice Devin in writing the majority
opinion in Raleigh v. Mechanics and Farmers Bank, supra, when he
said, at page 291: "It would seem also that succeeding legislatures also
considered that the Act barred foreclosure suits on assessment installments ten years past due, for in 1931, and again in 1933, and again in
1935, and again in 1937, and again in 1939, and again in 1941, and
again in 1943, municipal corporations were given the right by resolution
to extend the time of payment of installments, which would enable them
to avoid the bar of the statute, if they desired to do so." (Italics ours.)

